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Table	1.	Top	10	Recipients	of	Remittances	 	 	 	 	 	 	 86	
	











CIA	 	 	 Central	Intelligence	Agency	(US)	
	
CIP	 	 	 Citizenship-by-Investment	Program	
	
EU	 	 	 European	Union	
	
EUDO	 	 	 European	Union	Democracy	Observatory	on	Citizenship	
	
FDI	 	 	 Foreign	Direct	Investment	
	
GCC	 	 	 Gulf	Cooperation	Council	
	
ICT	 	 	 Information	and	Communication	Technology	
	
IGO	 	 	 Intergovernmental	Organization	
	
INGO	 	 	 International	Non-Governmental	Organization	
	
ISO	 	 	 International	Organization	for	Standardization	
	
KSA	 	 	 Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia	
	
OECD	 	 	 Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	
	
QCA	 	 	 Qualitative	Content	Analysis	
	
UAE	 	 	 United	Arab	Emirates	
	
UN	 	 	 United	Nations	
	
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































application	have	 their	 citizenship	 restored.	 They	 shall	 be	 deemed	never	 to	 have	been	



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































India	 $62,745,000.00	 $44.2	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
China	 $35,225,583.77	 $135.6	billion	 Not	Allowed	 Authoritarian	
Philippines	 $31,144,632.28	 $5.2	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Mexico	 $28,667,958.48	 $30.3	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
France	 $24,220,419.13	 $42.9	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Pakistan	 $19,846,568.13	 $864.7	million	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Nigeria	 $18,956,000.00	 $3.1	billion	 Allowed	 Authoritarian	
Germany	 $16,683,183.24	 $31.7	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Egypt	 $16,584,486.59	 $6.9	billion	 Not	Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	


































































































































































































































India	^	 $	1.5	Million	 n/a	 Investments	totaling	between	100-250	million	Rupees	over	3	years	and	create	
20	Indian	jobs	
	



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Bahrain	(1)	 June	2011	 1,195,020	 48.9	 51.1	
Kuwait	(2)	 End	October	2014	 4,079,698	 31.5	 68.9	
Oman	(3)	 mid-2014	 3,992,893	 56.6	 43.4	
Qatar	(4)	 April	2010	 1,699,435	 14.3	 85.7	
Saudi	Arabia	(5)	 mid-2013	 29,994,272	 67.6	 32.4	
United	Arab	Emirates	(6)	 mid-2010	 8,264,070	 11.5	 88.5	
Total*	 	 49,225,388	 52.0	 48.0	
*	Provides	the	sum	of	population	numbers	at	different	dates	between	April	2010	and	October	2014.	It	is	
representative	of	the	combined	total	population	at	all	the	listed	dates.	
	
Given	the	observed	multinational	demography	of	the	Council	and	its	dependence	on	
foreign	investment,	it	would	stand	to	reason	that	they	would	employ	more	liberal	approaches	
to	citizenship.	However,	the	opposite	appears	to	be	occurring,	where	very	few	individuals	meet	
the	basic	criteria	to	apply	for	naturalization.	In	addition,	some	of	those	in	power—for	example	
Sheikh	Mohammed	of	the	UAE—do	not	see	a	link	between	an	internationally	integrated	
economy,	or	status	as	a	global	city	as	a	threat	to	its	national	identity	(Vora	2013).	Following	this	
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thinking,	a	country	could	be	made	up	of	any	number	of	different	groups,	as	long	as	a	
homogenous	and	exclusive	dominant	group	remains	in	power.	
	 GCC	countries	not	only	share	similar	demographic	statistics,	but	also	hold	similar	ratings	
in	the	2015	Democracy	Index	(The	Economist	2016).	All	six	countries	are	classified	as	
authoritarian	states,	placing	them	in	the	most	restrictive	third	of	the	list.	As	noted	in	Chapter	3,	
within	the	Democracy	Index’s	system,	authoritarian	regimes	are	those	which	place	obstructions	
in	press	reporting	with	many	media	outlets	being	state	controlled,	if	elections	are	held	they	are	
not	free	with	candidates	representing	a	single	party,	and	public	protest	is	barred.	As	such,	GCC	
countries	are	governed	via	autocratic	rule,	and	foreign	watch-dog	groups	voice	significant	
concerns	regarding	the	various	countries’	human	rights	records	(Human	Rights	Watch	2006,	
2015;	Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008).	While	much	of	the	focus	has	been	placed	on	the	
UAE’s	troubled	record	with	guestworkers,	given	the	country’s	status	as	a	world	economic	
center	(Abdi	2015;	Kanna	2011),	the	treatment	of	foreign	workers	should	be	a	regional	concern	
as	foreign	workers	drive	a	variety	of	industries.	Further,	the	region’s	political	stance	suggests	
that	the	countries	are	more	likely	to	resist	dual	citizenship,	as	a	sign	of	liberal	citizenship.	The	
qualitative	results	are	echoed	by	Mirilovic’s	(2015)	quantitative	findings	that	authoritarian	
countries	that	experience	high	numbers	of	low-skilled	foreign	immigrants	are	less	likely	to	
adopt	dual	citizenship.	Thus,	the	first	aspect	of	script	adoption—type	of	political	regime—favors	
ascriptive	citizenship	norms,	in	this	case.	
		 However,	before	delving	deeper	into	the	human	rights	records	of	GCC	countries,	one	
must	first	discuss	the	basis	of	treatment:	the	citizenship	laws	in	the	region.	
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Ascriptive	Dominance	
	 Lending	support	to	the	“authoritarian-ascriptive	norms”	argument	are	the	citizenship	
laws	in	place	in	the	region.	As	the	GCC,	itself,	was	founded	based	on	national	similarities,	the	
general	citizenship	processes	for	the	member	countries	are	very	similar,	thereby	allowing	me	to	
make	some	generalizations.	Each	country	uses	a	jus	sanguinis	approach	to	citizenship	
transmission.	Within	this	system,	national	membership	is	passed	to	an	individual	via	the	
patrilineal	line.	The	patriarchal	nature	of	citizenship	is	further	illustrated	in	the	Kuwaiti	
citizenship	law,	as	it	states	that	“Any	person	born	in,	or	outside,	Kuwait	whose	father	is	a	
Kuwaiti	national	shall	be	a	Kuwaiti	national	himself”	(Kuwait	1959).	Citizenship	is	only	inherited	
from	one’s	mother	if	the	identity	of	their	father	is	unknown.	While	this	caveat	is	present	in	
other	national	citizenship	laws,	such	as	the	Egyptian	case	presented	in	Chapter	4,	Tétreault	
(2000)	has	suggested	that	this	rule	is	a	holdover	from	Islamic	law.	Within	this	legal	realm,	one’s	
status	is	directly	tied	to	their	rights,	with	different	statuses	ascribed	to	someone	who	is	
married,	divorced,	or	their	spouse	has	died.	The	KSA	articles	surrounding	spousal	citizenship	
show	a	loosening	within	this	claim,	noting:	
If	an	individual	lost	his	Saudi	Citizenship,	the	following	terms	apply	to	his	wife	and	children:	
	
a-	Wife	of	the	individual	who	have	lost	his	Saudi	Citizenship	according	to	the	Article	(13)	
[acquiring	foreign	citizenship	without	permission,	working	with	foreign	government	or	military	
without	permission,	taking	a	role	against	the	Kingdom	during	armed	conflict,	or	refusing	to	quit	
a	foreign	post]	have	the	right	whether	to	follow	her	husband’s	new	nationality	or	to	keep	her	
Saudi	Nationality,	and	she	has	the	right	to	recover	her	Saudi	Citizenship	in	case	of	divorce.	
However,	children	residing	outside	the	Kingdom	have	the	right	to	acquire	the	Saudi	Citizenship	
when	they	reached	the	legal	age.	
	
b-	If	an	individual	lost	his	Saudi	Citizenship	according	to	the	Article	(11)	[acquiring	foreign	
citizenship	without	permission],	his	wife	and	children	will	not	lose	their	Saudi	Citizenship	as	a	
result.	(Saudi	Arabia	1953)	
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As	such,	girls	are	born	into	the	status	of	their	fathers,	but	married	women’s	statuses,	at	least	in	
the	KSA’s	case,	provide	a	modicum	of	liberalization	if	her	husband	has	been	found	to	be	in	
violation	of	national	law.		
	 Bolstering	the	regional	preference	toward	ascriptive	norms,	naturalization	processes—
the	second	indicator	of	liberal	citizenship	norms—have	been	restricted.	GCC	countries	limit	
who	can	apply	for	citizenship	due	to	ethnocultural	factors,	thereby	creating	monoethnic	states	
(Aktürk	2012),	like	the	Egyptian	and	German	examples	from	Chapter	4.	Oman’s	Royal	Decree	
addressing	citizenship	(Oman	2014)	provides	a	useful	example	of	this	limiting	process.	While	
the	ethnic	basis	of	citizenship	is	not	overt,	in	this	case,	language	and	cultural	assimilation	
processes	are	present	in	Article	15	of	the	law:	
1.	He	should	have	resided	in	Oman	for	at	least	20	continuous	years,	or	15	years	if	married	to	an	
Omani	woman	provided	that	their	marriage	shall	have	taken	place	after	obtaining	approval	of	
the	Ministry	of	Interior…and	he	shall	have	a	son	from	his	Omani	wife.	
	 2.	Fluency	in	Arabic…	
	 6.	Written	consent	to	relinquish	current	nationality	and	proof	of	such	(Oman	2014)	
	
The	extended	period	of	residency	required	prior	to	applying	for	naturalization	assures	that	
approved	candidates	have	become	accustomed	to	Oman’s	culture.	Further,	the	common	
language	requirement	is	present	to	aid	in	one’s	incorporation	into	the	imagined	community.	
Despite	the	link	to	local	culture	being	downplayed	in	the	updated	law	above,	the	1983	law	
highlights	the	importance	of	one’s	ethnicity	that	continues	in	the	country.	During	the	process	of	
acquiring	citizenship,	applicants	must	publicly	state	that	“I	swear	by	Almighty	God	to	be	loyal	to	
the	Sultante	[sic]	of	Oman	and	to	respect	the	laws,	costumes,	traditions,	and	be	a	good	citizen	
as	God	is	my	witness”	(Oman	2010).		
	 While	Oman’s	updated	citizenship	law	provides	an	example	of	limited	reliance	on	
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ethnicity	as	a	component	of	naturalization,	Kuwait’s	naturalization	policy	provides	explicit	
ethnic	requirements	surrounding	the	acquisition	of	citizenship.	Point	five	in	Article	4	states	that	
citizenship	applicants:	
…be	an	original	Muslim	by	birth,	or	that	he	has	converted	to	Islam	according	to	the	prescribed	rules	
and	procedures	and	that	a	period	of	at	least	5	years	has	passed	since	he	embraced	Islam	before	the	
grant	of	naturalization.	Nationality	thus	acquired	is	ipso	facto	lost	and	the	Decree	of	naturalization	
rendered	void	ab	initio	if	the	naturalized	person	expressly	renounces	Islam	or	if	he	behaves	in	such	a	
manner	as	clearly	indicates	his	intention	to	abandon	Islam.	In	any	such	case,	the	nationality	of	any	
dependant	[sic]	of	the	apostate	who	had	acquired	it	upon	the	naturalization	of	the	apostate	is	also	
rendered	void.	(Kuwait	1959)	
	
Religion,	here,	is	inextricably	tied	to	citizenship.	To	be	Kuwaiti,	one	must	be	Muslim	and	follow	
the	tents	of	Islam.	Further,	if	someone	renounces	Islam,	they	also	effectively	renounce	their	
citizenship.	Individuals	cannot	be	one	without	the	other.	
	 Despite	the	naturalization	processes	employed	by	GCC	countries	showing	signs	of	a	
liberalization	of	citizenship,	they	are	in	an	inchoate	form.	The	ascriptive	norms	of	citizenship,	
based	in	one’s	bloodline,	are	the	dominant	script	in	the	region,	and	while	naturalization	is	an	
option,	it	is	not	an	opportunity	that	is	accessible	by	all.	This	limiting	of	access	is	evident	in	the	
universal	prohibition	of	dual	citizenship	in	the	GCC.	Homogenously	worded	statements	to	the	
following	examples	of	dual	citizenship’s	illegality	are	found	across	the	region.	Article	15,	point	C	
in	UAE	Federal	Law	of	1972—which	is	still	the	“law	of	the	land”—notes	that	a	citizen	can	have	
his	status	revoked,	“If	he	has	adopted,	voluntarily,	a	nationality	of	another	country”	(UAE	
1972:5).	Qatar’s	law	supports	the	“single	nationality”	policy	noting	that	an	individual	can	lose	
their	nationality	if	he	or	she	“Acquires	the	nationality	of	another	country”	(Qatar	2005:3).	
Within	these	ascriptive	systems,	one	can	only	hold	allegiance	to	a	single	state,	thereby	limiting	
outsiders’	access	to	each	country’s	bundle	of	rights.	Further,	as	highlighted	in	this	piece’s	
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opening	vignettes	of	Nour	Miyati	and	the	bidoon	in	the	UAE,	legal	classification	can	significantly	
affect	how	one	navigates	their	daily	lives.	Citizens	can	gain	the	benefits	of	institutional	
protection	from	the	state’s	legal	and	judicial	systems,	whereas	non-citizens	may	risk	
deportation	for	seeking	help.	This	difference	puts	non-nationals	in	precarious	positions	where	
their	well-being	could	be	dependent	on	their	status.	
	
A	More	Complete	Picture	of	the	GCC	
	 While	the	previous	section	outlines	the	relationship	between	political	regime	and	liberal	
norms	in	the	GCC,	the	legal	examples	provided	use	a	language	of	exclusion	which	hint	at	other	
mechanisms	at	play.	As	such,	it	would	be	reductionist	to	assume	that	the	GCC	countries	reject	
the	liberal	citizenship	model	and	human	rights	based	citizenship	purely	based	on	authoritarian	
power.	While	despots	wield	significant	power	in	their	homelands,	they	are	not	invincible,	as	the	
Arab	Spring	and	other	uprisings	have	shown.	Instead,	I	posit	that	the	regional	interpretation	of	
citizen	and	group	membership	are	housed	in	the	local	histories,	economies,	and	popular	views	
toward	non-nationals.	The	influences	of	these	variables	allow	us	to	locate	the	regional	rejection	
of	popular	world	citizenship	scripts,	and	see	the	justifications	into	why	this	occurs.	Despite	the	
council’s	almost	40-year	existence,	it	cannot	explain	the	development	of	a	semi-ubiquitous	
cultural	belief	systems	in	the	region.	It	is	within	the	regional	developments	before	the	GCC’s	
founding—located	in	religion,	socioeconomic	situations,	and	popular	views—where	one	can	
find	a	more	complete	explanation.	
	 A	basis	for	many	scholarly	debates	concerning	liberalism	in	the	Middle	East	lies	in	an	
examination	of	Islam	and	democracy.	The	Middle	East,	itself,	is	dominated	by	authoritarian-
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republican	regimes	that	justify	their	places	via	the	Western	concept	of	divine	right	(Mernissi	
1992;	Sisk	1992).	Telhami	(2013)	suggests	that	the	prevalence	and	general	acceptance	of	
authoritarian	regimes	by	Arab	groups	is	because	they	
have	never	fully	divorced	the	authoritarianism	of	their	rulers	from	the	Western-dominated	
international	order	that	they	see	as	having	cultivated	and	entrenched	these	rulers	in	power	
from	the	very	inception	of	the	modern	political	system	in	the	Arab	world	at	the	end	of	World	
War	I.	(p.19)	
	
As	such,	authoritarianism	is	a	direct	link	from	the	colonial	past	of	these	countries.	Further,	the	
bubble	vacated	by	the	abrupt	end	of	colonization	allowed	for	authoritarian	leaders	to	come	to	
power.	They	were	supported	by	the	most	organized	groups,	so	they	were	the	first	to	fill	the	gap	
(Hudson	1977).		
	 From	these	authoritarian	ties,	the	Middle	East	has	been	painted	as	a	landscape	
intolerant	to	democracy,	and	simultaneously	at	odds	with	it	(Said	1993;	Sick	1994).	As	Sisk	
(1992)	notes,	the	modern	Islamist’s	view	of	God’s	will	as	sovereign	can	help	explain	this	
perceived	friction.	Within	a	democratic	system,	the	people	are	the	mechanisms	of	government.	
The	will	of	the	people	is	heard	and	applied	via	elections,	public	discourse,	and	the	like.	Instead,	
within	the	modern	Islamist	system,	God	is	sovereign,	and	as	such,	humans	cannot	question	His	
will.	Further,	democracy	could	only	be	achieved	by	adhering	to	the	“shari’a	paradigm”	(Sisk	
1992:23).	While	popular	outcries	against	socioeconomic	problems	are	not	unheard	of	in	the	
Middle	East,	powerful	individuals	have	used	cultural	uncertainty	and	specific	interpretations	of	
the	Koran	to	maintain	their	positions.	
	 This	argument	of	“God’s	will”	as	justification	for	a	political	regime’s	existence	has	been	
weaponized	by	the	ruling	elite.	In	creating	an	unbridgeable	gap	between	the	Middle	East	and	
West,	leaders	created	literal	and	figurative	boundaries	from	the	unknown.	Within	the	regional	
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concept	of	the	hudud,	boundaries	are	solidly	designed	objects	intended	to	be	comforting	and	
protecting	to	those	feeling	fear	(Mernissi	1992).	By	regulating	who	could	enter	or	exit	an	area,	
visit	a	city,	or	do	business	in	a	region,	boundaries	helped	minimize	intergroup	conflicts;	gaining	
their	legitimacy	via	Koranic	passages	(Mernissi	1992).	Anything	outside	of	the	borders,	
particularly	those	areas	to	the	West,	took	on	the	symbolic	embodiment	of	fear	and	fright.	
“Gharb,	the	Arabic	word	for	the	West,	is	also	the	place	of	darkness	and	the	incomprehensible,	
always	frightening.	Everything	we	don’t	understand	is	frightening”	(Mernissi	1992:13).	While	
this	quote	is	in	direct	conversation	with	how	the	Middle	East	views	the	West,	it	also	applies	to	
the	West	while	looking	East.	Uncertainty	breeds	fear,	fear	could	lead	to	generalizations	and	
footholds	for	those	wishing	to	gain	power.	Group	unity,	then,	helped	reduce	uncertainty.	
	 Thereby,	the	darkness	of	the	West	could	be	used	as	justification	for	eschewing	the	ideas	
originating	there.	Further,	differences	can	be	used,	from	a	functionalist	perspective,	to	bring	us	
together.	Charismatic	leaders	know	this,	and	can	base	their	successes	off	it.	Legitimacy	is	
gained	through	the	effective	wielding	of	ideas.	As	such,	elites	in	the	Middle	East	have	used	
religious	doctrine,	uncertainty,	and	“otherness”	to	maintain	their	positions,	as	have	Western	
elites.	Within	the	case	of	the	GCC	and	rest	of	the	Middle	East,	the	difference	between	East	and	
West	has	fueled	differing	interpretations	of	how	society	should	be	run.		
	 In	addition	to	the	reliance	on	religion	as	a	social	adhesive,	discussed	above,	ideologies	
can	be	used	a	mechanism	of	resistance.	Consider	the	Western	concepts	of	modernity	and	
modernization.	The	philosophical	underpinnings	of	modernity	are	found	in	the	humanist	basis	
of	Western	Enlightenment	thinking	(Mernissi	1992;	Said	1993).	The	rise	of	individualism	was	
predicted	to	take	place	concurrent	with	the	declining	influence	of	religion.	As	such,	the	rights	of	
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the	individual	were	to	take	center	stage.	This	process,	now,	sees	the	rise	of	universal	human	
rights	regimes.	Gone	are	the	tribal	specifics	of	individual	nations,	as	states	now	turn	to	an	all-
encompassing,	universal	form	of	citizen.	
	 However,	in	the	GCC’s	case,	this	process	has	not	occurred.	According	to	Mernissi	(1992),	
the	rise	of	individual	responsibility—via	democracy,	rights	regimes,	etc.—frightens	the	elites	in	
the	Middle	East.	Personal	opinions	are	seen	to	“always	bring	violence”	(Mernissi	1992:19)	as	it	
indicates	group-level	disharmony.	Disagreeing	factions	are	harder	to	control.	To	prevent	this	
sort	of	breakdown,	regional	elites	highlighted	the	primordial	nature	of	differences	between	
groups,	as	noted	above,	but	also	restricted	access	to	the	ideas	modernism	was	based	in	
(Hudson	1977).	However,	to	placate	citizens,	they	were	allowed	access	to	certain	benefits	of	
modernization	via	selective	modernity	(Mernissi	1992;	Sisk	1992).	Individuals	can	buy	and	use	
modern	consumer	goods	(TVs,	cellphones,	automobiles)	without	adopting	the	ideologies	from	
the	countries	that	produced	them	(Ibrahim	1982).	While	modernist	ideas	may	be	largely	absent	
from	the	region,	the	products	of	modernization	are	widely	available	and	easily	adopted.	
	 What	has	taken	hold	in	the	place	of	modernism	are	some	regionally	based	ideologies	
intended	to	bring	groups	together.	Intended	to	minimize	interstate	skirmishes	and,	ultimately,	
culminate	with	the	founding	of	a	single	Arab	state,	Pan-Arabism	sought	to	emphasize	ethnicity	
over	nationality	or	geography	(Ayubi	1995;	Telhami	2013).	While	a	laudable	goal,	the	plan	was	
cast	aside	as	regional	differences	came	to	dominate	any	discussions	about	unification	(Ayubi	
1995).	The	GCC	can	be	thought	of	not	as	an	extension	of	the	Pan-Arabist	push,	but	as	an	
agreement	based	on	necessity.	As	noted	above,	the	GCC	countries	founded	their	allegiance	in	
shared	cultural,	economic,	and	social	characteristics.	Of	note	is	the	shared	oil	wealth	found	in	
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each	country,	as	these	discoveries	created	the	severe	inequities	between	nationals	and	non-
nationals,	as	has	been	shown	throughout	this	work.	
	 The	national	economies	of	GCC	members	are	run	based	on	landownership	and	granting	
foreign	companies	paid	access	to	those	areas	and	resources.	Referred	to	as	rentier	states,	these	
economies	are	characterized	by	not	only	relying	on	“substantial	external	rent,”	(Beblawi	
1987:51)	but	in	situations	where	rental	agreements	predominate;	a	limited	number	of	
individuals	or	groups	generate	the	rent,	with	most	individuals	involved	in	the	distribution	of	it,	
and	the	government	is	the	primary	recipient	of	the	money	from	rents	(Beblawi	1987).	This	
unique	economic	situation	is	thought	to	have	been	developed	in	GCC	countries	during	the	early	
to	mid-20th	century.	Kuwait	was	first	to	adopt	the	system	in	the	1950s,	which	later	spread	to	
Qatar	and	the	UAE.	Saudi	Arabia	had	a	similar	system	in	place	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	centered	
around	series	of	“land	gifts”	that	were	given	to	individuals	and	groups	that	the	regime	sought	
favor	with	(Beblawi	1987).	
	 In	the	GCC’s	case,	what	was	being	offered	by	the	governments	was	access	to	the	
region’s	oil	reserves.	Using	a	kafil,	or	sponsor,	land	deals	were	struck	where	laborers,	storage	
and	transportation	of	crude,	and	security	were	established.	As	such,	kafils	made	themselves	
indispensable	in	these	deals	since	they	could	bridge	the	uncertainties	between	the	local	and	
foreign	groups	and	arrange	for	the	proper	travel	documents	to	be	completed	(Ibrahim	1982).	
Without	access	to	a	local	sponsor,	many	visas	requests	were	likely	to	be	rejected	since	most	of	
the	region’s	countries	were—and	are—unlikely	to	grant	tourist	visas	(Ibrahim	1982).	
	 Despite	deals	being	in	place	for	land	access	and	shipping,	a	significant	resource	was	
missing:	workers.	To	minimize	costs,	kafils	began	to	act	as	recruiters	and	managers	of	workers.	
	 	
	 118	
Given	the	high	demand	for	the	region’s	oil,	companies	were	unable	to	locate	enough	workers	
to	staff	their	operations.	Further,	many	of	the	local	workers	who	were	available	were	not	
trained	to	manage	the	business	(Abdi	2015).	Given	these	constraints,	the	GCC	began	to	recruit	
laborers	to	fill	these	vacancies;	giving	birth	to	the	modern	guestworker	status.	Many	sponsors	
confiscated	legal	documents	as	part	of	the	hiring	process,	essentially	holding	workers	in	
temporary	slavery	until	their	contract	was	complete,	a	tactic	that	remains	until	today	(Ibrahim	
1982).	
	 While	such	an	overtly	exploitative	situation	seems	unethical	and	institutionally	
troublesome,	the	kafils’	existence	has	been	supported	in	two	significant	ways.	First,	they	have	
the	support	of	the	local	governments.	As	shown	with	domestic	guestworkers,	contracted	
workers	have	little	recourse	if	they	are	being	swindled	by	unethical	sponsors.	Further,	sponsors	
have	little	legal	motivation	to	treat	workers	humanely.	National	laws	and	regulations	support	
the	sponsors’	actions	as	they	are	doing	a	significant	service	for	the	government	(Beblawi	1987;	
Ibrahim	1982).		
	 Second,	given	the	institutional	support	of	sponsorship	practices	and	virtually	assured	
profitability	of	the	rentier	state,	the	beneficiaries	of	the	system	begin	to	see	themselves	as	
fundamentally	different	from	the	scores	of	workers.	A	“rentier	mentality”	(Beblawi	1987:52),	
develops	due	to	a	breakdown	between	the	reward-causation	relationship	in	work.	Instead	of	
the	financial	rewards	of	work	being	dependent	on	the	amount	of	risk	an	individual	takes	on,	the	
rewards	are	doled	out	based	on	situation.	As	such,	groups	that	are	entitled	to	the	financial	
profits	from	a	deal	see	themselves	as	deserving,	even	if	their	only	“contribution”	was	being	
born	into	that	position.	While	superficially	minor,	this	mental	splitting	between	deserving	and	
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non-deserving	groups	can	lead	to	justifying	different	treatment.	Guestworkers	and	other	non-
national	groups	were	not	born	into	citizenship,	so	their	having	to	perform	labor	is	an	indicator	
of	group	membership.	Citizens	garner	the	benefits	of	the	rent	relationships	in	a	variety	of	
forms,	including	payments,	access	to	interest	free	loans,	and	access	to	state	sponsored	
institutions	(Longva	2000).	While	the	national	economy	depends	on	the	work	of	non-nationals,	
they	are	not	granted	access	to	the	fruits	of	that	labor,	purely	based	on	citizenship	status.	
	 Further,	the	GCC’s	reliance	on	foreign	workers	has	caused	some	problems	aside	from	
the	accusations	of	worker	abuse	outlined	throughout	this	piece.	As	previously	shown,	when	the	
rentier	economy	was	established,	it	required	large	populations	of	workers	that	were	recruited	
from	outside	national	borders.	While	that	policy	worked	well	to	get	the	number	of	hands	
needed	to	fill	the	staffing	needs	of	invested	companies,	the	reliance	on	these	workers	has	kept	
many	nationals	out	of	the	job	market.	As	a	result,	some	GCC	countries	are	developing	programs	
to	increase	the	numbers	of	national	workers	in	the	workplace,	thereby	making	them	less	reliant	
on	the	benefits	associated	with	the	rentier	system.	One	notable	example	can	be	found	in	the	
Saudi	Nitaqat	program	that	was	implemented	in	2011	to	incentivize	the	hiring	of	Saudi	
nationals	by	Saudi-based	companies	(Sadi	2013).	The	plan	was	largely	supported	by	ICT	
investors	and	used	e-tools	to	track	workers,	with	a	goal	to	marry	the	needs	of	the	government’s	
desire	to	track	where	workers	were	and	the	people	who	were	looking	for	gainful	employment.	
However,	the	program	has	run	into	logistical	roadblocks	that	revolve	around	the	national	
economy’s	dependence	on	foreign	labor	and	the	government’s	desire	to	provide	more	jobs	for	
nationals.	
	 The	program	uses	a	four-classification	color-coded	system	according	to	how	many	
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Saudis	the	companies	employ.	Each	color	(high	to	low:	platinum,	green,	yellow,	and	red)	is	
awarded	according	to	the	field	(or	activity)	the	company	is	involved	in	(e.g.	wholesale	and	retail	
trade)	and	size	of	the	company,	with	higher	rankings	going	to	those	companies	whose	
workforce	is	composed	of	a	larger	percentage	of	Saudi	nationals.	However,	the	smallest	
companies	(1-9	employees)	are	exempt	from	the	Nitaqat	coding	system,	but	are	legally	
required	to	have	at	least	1	Saudi	national	(Massoud	2013).	
	 The	hiring	of	marginalized	groups	(such	as	disabled	job	seekers)	is	incentivized	within	
the	current	system.	For	example,	the	hiring	of	a	disabled	Saudi	male	or	female	counts	“as	four	
people	in	the	nationalization	equation”	(Massoud	2013:2),	thus	providing	greater	incentives	to	
include	these	individuals	in	the	workforce.		However,	within	the	program,	hiring	students	is	
penalized	as	they	count	as	0.5	people	in	the	equation.	Ideally,	this	move	encourages	the	hiring	
of	full-time	professionals,	as	opposed	to	temporary	workers.	Linked	with	the	Nitaqat	policy’s	
concern	over	worker	inclusion	is	the	importance	of	wage	equity	within	the	field.	Any	employee	
earning	less	than	3,000	Riyals	counts	as	less	than	one	person	within	the	calculation.	If	they	
make	under	1,500	Riyals,	they	are	excluded	from	the	equation	all-together	(Massoud	2013).	
	 While	the	Nitaqat	program	makes	sense	when	considering	the	Saudi	working	force,	the	
situation	begs	the	question:	Why	should	employers	bother	adhering	to	the	program’s	
guidelines?	Further,	why	should	they	turn	away	from	relying	on	guestworkers	who	will	work	for	
less?	In	short,	observing	the	program’s	guidelines	provides	employers	with	the	opportunity	to	
hire	additional	foreign-born	workers	(Massoud	2013).	If	a	company	earns	a	green	or	platinum	
rating,	they	can	gain	access	to	an	expedited	online	process	for	renewing	foreign	employee	work	
permits,	adjust	foreign	employees’	professions,	and	hire	foreign	workers	from	red	and	yellow	
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rated	businesses	without	receiving	the	previous	employer’s	approval.	Beyond	these	benefits,	
there	are	restrictions	to	poorer	performing	businesses.	Yellow	rated	employers	are	only	
allowed	to	renew	visas	for	foreign	employees	with	less	than	six	years	of	service	in	the	KSA.	
Further,	these	employers	can	only	apply	for	a	new	visa	after	the	permanent	departure	of	two	
expatriate	workers.	Red	employers	are	unable	to	hire	new	expatriate	workers,	renew	current	
work	permits,	or	open	new	business	branches	within	the	KSA	until	their	status	improves	
(Massoud	2013).	These	restrictions,	added	to	the	potential	of	employees	being	poached	from	
higher	ranking	firms	is	thought	to	provide	an	effective	motivation	to	employ	nationals	as	
employees.	
	 However,	while	this	system	will	focus	on	limiting	expatriate	employment	within	the	
Kingdom	and	has	been	running	relatively	smoothly	since	its	implementation	in	2011,	it	has	run	
into	recent	roadblocks.	In	early	2015,	the	third	phase	of	the	program,	focusing	on	the	
“Saudization”	of	businesses	by	drastically	increasing	the	localization	quotas	of	the	program	was	
scheduled	to	be	implemented.	According	to	a	news	report	by	Mary	Sophia	(2015),	the	phase	
would	increase	“retail	and	wholesale	firms…quotas	from	29	per	cent	to	44	per	cent	while	other	
major	commercial	firms	are	required	to	increase	the	limits	from	29	per	cent	to	66	per	cent.”	
This	drastic	increase	drew	concern	from	the	Council	of	Saudi	Chambers	who	requested	that	the	
phase	be	put	into	practice	over	“two	to	three	years”	(Ghafour	2015)	for	more	qualified	job	
candidates	to	be	created.	The	lack	of	suitable	national	candidates	would	have	a	negative	effect	
on	Saudi	companies	as	they	would	be	subject	to	the	stipulations	outlined	in	phase	three,	but	
unable	to	find	enough	quality	job	candidates	to	fill	the	openings	(Naffee	2015).	Because	of	
these	concerns,	the	phase’s	start	has	been	delayed	for	three	years.	
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	 This	delay	is	particularly	beneficial	to	the	construction	industry,	which	employs	large	
numbers	of	expatriate	workers.	In	a	piece	outlining	the	impact	of	the	delay	on	Saudi	firms,	an	
anonymous	Indian	worker	suggested	that	if	the	third	phase	went	ahead	as	scheduled,	it	would	
mean	that	“nearly	50	percent	of	expatriate	workers	would	have	to	leave	the	kingdom”	(Naffee	
2015),	leaving	more	job	openings	than	there	are	job	seekers.	
The	Nitaqat	example	is	illustrative	of	the	complex	nature	surrounding	guestworkers	and	
the	economies	that	depend	on	them.	While	national	policies	seek	to	marginalize	the	groups,	
oftentimes	denying	any	path	to	citizenship,	national	economies	have	developed	around	the	
availability	and	need	of	cheap	labor.	As	such,	when	efforts	to	increase	the	numbers	of	
employed	national	workers	are	implemented,	they	run	up	against	a	reality	that	many	national	
workers	may	not	know	how	to	do	the	jobs	that	become	available.	Further,	as	many	expatriates	
are	employed	in	positions	that	many	nationals	would	rather	not	do—such	as	sanitation	or	
construction—there	is	little	that	can	be	done	to	attract	“affluent	Saudis”	to	these	positions	
(Sophia	2015).	By	dismissing	various	jobs,	in	general,	as	“below”	one’s	station,	the	prominence	
of	the	rentier	mentality	is	on	display.	
Turning	to	the	UAE,	one	can	see	how	a	non-national	group	can	be	kept	outside	of	the	
citizenship	process	despite	making	significant	contributions	to	the	national	culture.	Within	this	
intricate	relationship	between	Indian	expats,	migrants,	and	guest-workers	and	UAE	nationals	is	
an	issue	surrounding	culture	and	context,	as	well	as	economics.	Considering	the	economic	
context,	Vora	(2013)	has	shown	how	despite	being	excluded	from	the	naturalization	process,	
Indians	in	Dubai	have	successfully	integrated	themselves	into	the	national	economy.	Not	only	
do	Indian	migrants	occupy	manual	labor	positions	that	one	tends	to	expect	from	migrant	
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workers	(e.g.	construction,	housekeeping,	etc.),	but	they	have	incorporated	themselves	into	
more	prestigious	positions,	with	individuals	becoming	successful	businessmen	and	IT	workers.	
Further,	the	connections	between	the	Indian	diaspora	in	Dubai	and	the	global	city,	itself,	extend	
beyond	the	economic	realm.	Indian	sections	of	the	city	have	been	established	and	Indian	
cuisine	is	commonly	available	(Vora	2013).		
	 Migrant	groups	have	also	contributed	to	the	culture	of	Dubai,	as	well.	Local	restaurants	
cater	to	the	needs	of	foreign	workers	by	serving	items	from	their	homelands	(Vora	2013;	Vora	
&	Koch	2015)	and	shops	carry	custom-printed	fabrics	that	women	use	to	make	dresses	(Abdi	
2015).	This	cultural	integration	has	become	so	complete	that	shopkeepers	in	the	Dubai	Gold	
Market	in	Deira	frequently	call	to	shoppers	in	their	native	tongues.	This	is	especially	impressive	
when	the	shopkeepers	use	Somali,	which	has	about	10-million	speakers	worldwide	(Abdi	2015).		
Yet,	within	this	scope	and	despite	some	families	living	in	Dubai	for	multiple	generations,	
non-nationals	in	Dubai	and	the	rest	of	the	GCC	are	“impossible	citizens”	since	they	have	a	
significant	impact	on	the	region,	yet	are	actively	kept	outside	the	status	of	citizen.	To	help	
legitimize	this	exclusion,	the	UAE	government	has	delineated	various	categories	of	individual	as	
part	of	the	process	to	implement	neoliberal	policies	in	the	nation.	Among	these	are	citizen,	
expat,	and	worker.	Citizens	experience	the	greatest	amount	of	economic	opportunity	in	the	
country,	while	often	garnering	the	highest	paying	jobs,	despite	sometimes	being	unqualified	to	
fill	those	roles	(Vora	2013).	In	the	UAE,	this	group	is	in	the	extreme	numerical	minority	with	
only	an	estimated	10	to	20-percent	of	all	residents	being	in	the	category	(GLMM	2014;	Vora	
2013:44).	Freedom	of	residence,	length	of	stay	in	Dubai,	and	cross	city	movement	is	then	
increasingly	restricted	until	reaching	the	lowest	rank:	workers.	Many	times,	workers	reside	in	
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work	camps	segregated	from	the	city’s	center.	This	geography	of	status	is	familiar	to	many	of	
Dubai’s	residents	as	they	can	identify	which	groups	live	in	which	region	and,	further,	what	skin	
colors	are	welcome	where	(Vora	2013).	
	
Limits	to	Inclusion	
	 What	the	case	of	the	GCC	illustrates	is	the	complexities	tied	to	script	acceptance.	While	
the	Council’s	members	are	in	close	contact	with	foreign	investors	via	the	rentier	system,	many	
of	whom	have	adopted	liberal	citizenship	norms,	they	have	still	elected	to	rely	on	ascriptive	
norms	of	membership.	While	this	decision	is	partly	based	on	the	authoritarian	political	regimes	
held	by	the	countries,	it	is	not	solely	on	the	shoulders	of	politics.	As	I	have	shown,	the	seeds	of	
exclusivity	were	sown	during	the	region’s	colonial	past.	During	this	period,	tribalism	and	group	
membership	were	used	to	create	safety.	Those	coming	from	“other”	groups	or	regions	were	
viewed	with	suspicion,	as	is	the	case	of	any	other	geographic	region	or	cultural	group.	However,	
this	skepticism	was	effectively	harnessed	by	powerful	elites	seeking	to	gain	power	in	the	post-
colonial	era.	By	highlighting	the	differences	between	the	West	and	Middle	East,	elites	could	
construct	a	society	steeped	in	religious	belief,	while	avoiding	the	Enlightenment	and	humanist	
thinking	which	had	gained	traction	in	Europe	and	other	parts	of	the	world.		
	 By	being	able	to	minimize	the	influence	of	an	ideologically	humanist	turn,	national	
leaders	could	also	dictate	the	language	surrounding	membership,	and	who	could	become	“one	
of	us.”	Citizenship,	in	these	terms,	was	not	based	upon	a	set	of	universal	human	rights,	as	
observed	in	countries	that	have	adopted	liberal	citizenship	norms,	but	on	an	indestructible	link	
between	ethnic	membership	and	citizenship.	Monoethnic	states	were	created	using	this	
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rationale,	and	only	those	who	had	come	from	other	similar	states,	or	converted	to	the	
dominant	ethnic	group,	could	hope	to	gain	access	to	citizens’	rights.	After	the	founding	of	the	
rentier	system,	citizenship	also	meant	access	to	economic	stability.	Being	a	citizen	meant	that	
one	was	entitled	to	a	portion	of	the	money	that	the	government	received	from	providing	access	
to	the	local	resources.	Further,	citizenship	allowed	individuals	to	act	as	sponsors	in	other	
ventures,	thereby	guaranteeing	additional	income	by	acting	as	a	go-between	for	foreign	
workers	and	local	companies.	The	rentier	mentality	was	born	from	this	situation.	Citizens	
became	viewed	as	rightful	recipients	of	rights,	while	non-citizens’	exclusion	was	justified.	They	
have	to	work	because	they	are	different	from	us.	
	 While	the	baskets	of	local	rights	that	GCC	citizens	access	are	significant,	the	rights	are	
only	open	to	a	small	number	of	people.	The	swaths	of	foreign	guestworkers	the	region	relies	on	
are	barred	from	ever	gaining	citizenship.	Despite	workers	raising	families	in	their	adoptive	
homes,	spending	their	lives	working	for	local	companies,	and	their	cultures	being	integrated	
into	cities’	landscapes,	they	cannot	ever	be	“one	of	us.”	Sponsors	limit	workers’	movements	by	
confiscating	legal	documents,	and	abuse	is	tolerated	by	the	authorities.	Further,	there	is	little	
public	call	to	change	the	existing	system.	Generally,	the	citizens	are	benefitting	by	keeping	non-
nationals	marginalized	and	out	of	the	rewards	system.	Leadership	has	no	cause	to	change	since	
they	are,	relatively,	immune	to	criticism	or	public	recourse.	Further,	the	public,	many	times,	
cannot	sympathize	with	the	workers.	“No	one	puts	a	gun	to	the	[expatriates’]	heads.	If	they	
don’t	like	[the	working	conditions]	here,	they	can	go	elsewhere”	(Kanna	2011:44).	
	 As	such,	what	the	case	of	the	GCC	shows	us	is	that	norm	adoption	is	contingent	on	the	
social,	economic,	and	political	environment	of	a	place	as	well	as	its	history	and	culture.	What	
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ideologies	dominate	the	region?	Who	is	in	charge	and	how	did	they	get	there?	How	does	the	
local	population	view	the	issue	at	hand?	These	things	come	together	to	help	agents	evaluate	
the	applicability	of	available	scripts.	While	the	scripts	of	liberal	citizenship	norms	may	be	
prevalent	and	influential,	there	is	still	space	for	resistance	against	them,	and	this	resistance	
cannot	be	identified	using	a	single	variable.	To	understand	what	has	happened,	one	must	
consider	the	whole	country	or	region	in	its	historical	and	cultural	contexts.	
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Chapter	7	
A	Rocky	Landscape	
	
	
This	work	has	addressed	the	question	of	citizenship	in	a	few	different	ways.	First,	it	
attends	to	the	traditional	understanding	of	citizenship	as	primarily	an	exclusive	form	of	
membership	in	a	polity.	Within	this	scope,	one’s	status	as	a	member	means	that	one	is	part	of	a	
limited	group	who	has	exclusive	access	to	membership	benefits	available	from	the	state	after	
the	Marshallian	schema	of	civil,	political,	and	social	rights.	The	exclusivity	of	national	citizenship	
is	designed	via	the	ascriptive	transmission	of	membership,	thus,	limiting	its	availability	to	those	
who	can	be	connected	through	blood	or	soil.	Second,	I	have	also	analyzed	the	emerging	forms	
of	citizenship	with	increasingly	plastic	membership,	including	postnational	forms,	deriving	
legitimacy	from	an	extension	of	universal	human	rights	as	well	as	monetary	forms	based	on	CIP	
schemes.	The	second	manner	of	gaining	citizenship	rights	has	transnational	origins	as	opposed	
to	the	ones	stemming	from	one’s	tight	coupling	with	national	territory	or	ancestry.		
	 Instead	of	solely	relying	on	citizenship	as	an	heirloom	to	be	passed	down	through	
generations,	the	liberalization	processes	outlined	here	have	shown	that	citizenship	is	becoming	
post-	or	transnational.	No	longer	do	one’s	ties	to	a	geographic	region	act	as	the	sole	
determinant	of	one’s	future.	Individuals	have	gained	the	ability	to	cast	off	their	birth	
nationalities	for	citizenships	from	other	places,	as	one	can,	in	principle,	hold	memberships	in	
multiple	locales,	and	some	can	even	go	as	far	as	to	collect	passports	to	create	personal	
advantages	in	business	and	travel.	Further,	the	rights	that	are	tied	to	each	status	can	be	
similarly	traded.	If	one’s	birth-state	makes	business	travel	difficult,	thereby	impeding	their	
career,	they	can	now	have	options	to	gain	the	rights	of	others	and	avoid	those	circumstances.	
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	 This	ability	to	pick-and-choose	rights	and	memberships	brings	me	to	the	final	main	
incarnation	of	citizenship	in	this	piece:	inequity.	The	differences	between	the	“haves”	and	
“have	nots”	have	been	a	topic	of	concern	for	sociologists,	and	other	social	scientists,	since	the	
field’s	inception.	Vast	bodies	of	literature	have	examined	how	different	racial	groups	
experience	different	social	realities,	dependent	on	the	educational	and	socioeconomic	
opportunities	available	to	them.	Those	groups	with	access	to	the	most	opportunities	had	
comparatively	better	chances	to	“succeed”	in	life,	by	getting	an	education,	landing	more	
prestigious	jobs,	and	accessing	the	wealth	that	both	achievements	can	yield.	Those	with	little	
access	to	the	same	institutions	and	choices,	may	not	be	as	equipped	to	succeed.	For	example,	
they	may	be	forced	to	shorten	their	time	in	school	to	take	on	low-paying	work	to	support	their	
family,	thereby	limiting	their	access	to	wealth	and	the	freedoms	that	come	along	with	it.	
	 While	interest	in	inequality	has	included	inter-state	comparisons	after	the	rise	of	
globalization,	which	saw	some	countries	benefit	more	than	others,	one	can	use	these	same	
metrics	to	consider	citizenship.	Because	not	all	citizenships	are	created	equal,	one’s	life	chances	
and	opportunities	are	tied	to	one’s	ability	to	access	citizenships	with	higher	dividends	(Shachar	
2009).	While	inequity	persists	within	the	nation-state,	one	must	now	consider	the	differences	in	
rights	gained	via	group	membership.	The	locale	of	one’s	birth,	and	the	identification	papers	
they	gain	at	that	point,	can	have	a	significant	impact	on	whether	they	can	conduct	international	
business	deals,	access	other	educational	opportunities,	avoid	persecution,	exercise	various	
freedoms,	or	travel	safely	across	borders	in	times	of	distress.	Further,	being	born	without	those	
papers	can	mean	that	individuals	may	not	be	protected	by	local	laws,	could	be	targeted	for	
abuse,	or	subject	to	arbitrary	expulsion	from	the	state,	even	if	they	were	born	there.	As	such,	
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citizenship	can	act	as	protection	for	the	individual,	but	those	protections	differ	according	to	
where	someone	is	and	what	papers	they	carry.	
	 However,	as	citizenship	becomes	disentangled	from	the	nation-state,	as	shown	by	the	
liberalization	of	membership.	Citizenship	has	moved	away	from	the	exclusivity	of	strict,	birth-
based	membership,	often	employing	a	more	inclusive	set	of	norms.	The	first	step	in	this	
separation	is	through	the	process	of	naturalization.	Through	naturalization,	individuals	born	
outside	of	a	given	state	can	apply	to	gain	citizenship.	Further,	this	process	of	formal	inclusion	
also	helped	extend	the	goals	of	republican	citizenship:	bring	more	individuals	into	the	imagined	
community	with	popular	sovereignty	(Leydet	2014;	Walzer	1989).	Once	individuals	had	
successfully	navigated	the	requirements	to	gain	group	membership,	they	had	access	to	the	
rights	of	the	area.	Naturalization,	then,	was	a	first	step	in	allowing	citizenship	to	become	
focused	on	the	individual	and	what	their	needs	and	preferences	were.	
	 The	second	important	trend	in	the	liberalization	of	citizenship	norms	pertains	to	the	
increased	acceptance	of	dual	citizenship.	This	study	found	that	dual	citizenship	policies	have	
been	enacted	by	131	countries,	essentially	meaning	that	131	countries	now	allow	their	citizens	
to	access	multiple	sets	of	rights	inside	and	outside	the	national	territory.	However,	dual	
citizenship	also	calls	into	question	what	a	citizen	should	be.	Critics	of	the	process	note	that	
individuals	cannot	hold	allegiances	to	multiple	states.	By	being	a	legal	member	of	two	groups,	
how	are	the	responsibilities	of	the	individual	distributed?	What	this	criticism	leads	to	is	a	
question	of	trust:	How	does	the	state	know	that	they	are	one	of	“us?”	Many	recent	political	
arguments	against	dual	citizenship	have	taken	this	tone.	In	addition	to	the	criticisms	leveled	at	
German	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel’s	call	for	extending	dual	citizenship	noted	in	Chapter	4	
	 	
	 130	
(Huggler	2016),	the	status—and	those	holding	it—has	been	a	frequent	target	of	conservative	
politicians	across	much	of	the	world.	In	the	United	States,	the	Trump	administration’s	
attempted	ban	on	various	immigrant	groups	also	sought	to	ban	dual	citizenship	holders	from	
targeted	nations	(Seipel	2017).	Zimbabwe’s	Registrar	General	Tobaiwa	Mudede	has	proposed	
eliminating	dual	citizenship	from	the	country’s	new	constitution,	citing	security	concerns	
(Chronicle	2017).	Lastly,	a	Sri	Lankan	member	of	parliament	lost	her	seat	due	to	failing	to	
renounce	her	Swiss	citizenship	(Outlook	2017).	What	one	learns	from	these	cases	is	that	while	
dual	citizenship	policies	are	becoming	more	common,	they	are,	by	no	means,	universally	
accepted.	
	 As	a	final	sign	of	the	growing	separation	between	the	state	and	citizenship,	a	
comprehensive	list	of	CIPs	was	created.	What	CIPs,	effectively,	do	is	allow	individuals	to	
purchase	access	to	other	sets	of	rights,	thereby	gaining	the	ability	to	increase	the	ease	of	travel	
between	nations,	become	active	in	foreign	economic	markets,	and,	also,	gain	social	capital	
among	their	colleagues	and	competitors.	Within	these	programs,	the	increasing	inequity	of	
citizenship	is	fully	exposed.	No	longer	does	one	only	need	worry	about	their	passport	being	
worth	more-or-less	than	a	foreign	colleague’s,	but	now,	those	who	can	afford	the	application	
processes	and	investments	can	gain	access	to	completely	new	sets	of	rights,	giving	them	
substantive	advantages	over	others	in	the	region.	Ong’s	(1999)	study	of	flexible	citizens,	having	
access	to	the	most	passports	can	be	a	symbol	of	a	better	businessperson.	As	such,	having	more	
passports	than	a	competitor	could	equal	more	lucrative	deals,	since	it	is	assumed	multiple	
holders	have	a	wider	menu	of	choices.	In	addition,	CIPs	also	allow	countries	to	expel	unwanted	
populations	by	buying	them	documents	from	other	regions,	then	deporting	them	to	those	
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locales.	As	Abrahamian	(2015)	noted,	the	bidoon	in	the	UAE	were	stateless	people,	so	the	
government	purchased	individuals	Comorian	citizenship	as	a	superficially	benevolent	gesture,	
then	deported	those	same	individuals	to	Comoros,	a	country	most	had	never	been	to.		
	 Again,	while	these	three	arcs	of	liberal	citizenship	illustrate	a	separation	between	the	
state	and	citizenship,	they	are	also	marked	by	inequality.	CIPs	function	along	the	traditional	
lines	of	inequality	by	allowing	those	with	higher	socioeconomic	statuses	to	gain	access	to	
opportunities	lower	ranked	individuals	cannot.	They	are	using	their	status	to	increase	their	
levels	of	access.	Dual	citizenship	allows	a	more	expansive	group	to	gain	access	to	multiple	sets	
of	rights,	thereby	not	tying	holders	to	a	specific	geographic	realm.	For	both	CIP	users	and	dual	
citizens,	if	their	home	country	is	experiencing	violence,	they	have	the	ability	and	means	to	avoid	
harm.	While	naturalization	could	allow	for	a	similar	safety	net,	it	is	one	that	is	not	open	to	all	
and	often	fraught	with	institutional	requirements.	To	change	one’s	citizenship,	they	may	need	
to	reside	in	the	area	for	an	extended	period,	adopt	the	dominant	culture,	and	renounce	their	
previous	nationality.	Within	this	trade-off,	there	are	tangible	benefits,	but	it	is	not	something	
that	can	be	done	quickly,	for	most	people.	I	argue	that	citizenship,	and	the	associated	regimes,	
are	seated	in	these	inequalities.	The	types	of	rights	groups	can	access,	who	can	access	them,	
and	how	quickly	one	can	gain	access	helps	set	them	apart	from	others;	thereby	gaining	new	
opportunities	blocked	for	some.	
	 However,	as	Chapter	6’s	case	study	notes,	not	all	countries	and	regions	are	embracing	
the	liberal	citizenship	norms	discussed	here.	The	GCC’s	history,	economic	arrangements,	and	
social	attitudes	towards	non-national	groups	creates	an	interesting	look	at	how	transnational	
scripts	can	be	adopted.	World	society	theory	helps	to	explain	the	dispersion	of	citizenship	
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norms,	but	a	dispersion	that	deeply	depends	on	the	state’s	political	type	(authoritarian	or	non-
authoritarian)	or	the	type	of	workers	present	(Mirilovic	2015).	This	research’s	qualitative	
approach	adds	support	to	other	quantitative	conclusions	that	regime-type	plays	a	role	in	dual	
citizenship	policy	adoption.	However,	this	study	adds	the	substantive	variables	of	culture,	
economy,	and	public	perception	to	the	script	tool-kit.	Within	the	GCC	example,	one	sees	that	a	
specific	reading	of	religion	and	culture	has	created	symbolic	situations	favoring	in-groups.	
Those	born	outside	of	the	region	cannot	be	trusted	or	incorporated,	due	to	these	long-held	
beliefs.		
Further,	while	the	democratic	norms	often	associated	with	liberal	citizenship	scripts	are	
absent	in	the	region,	it	is	not	due	to	some	fundamental	incompatibility	between	the	GCC	and	
democracy.	Instead,	I	posit	that	elite	focus	on	local	tribalism,	bolstered	by	their	restrictive	
reading	of	the	Koran,	was	used	to	justify	their	position.	A	position	that	was	further	supported	
when	oil	deposits	were	discovered	in	the	region,	leading	to	the	formation	of	the	rentier	state.	
This	allowed	the	economies	of	the	GCC	to	influence	social	situations	via	the	creation	of	entitled	
classes,	and	the	“others.”	Nationals	directly	benefit	from	the	rentier	arrangements,	and	see	
little	reason	to	include	non-national	workers	in	profits	and	entitlements.	Here,	citizenship	
grants	one	access	to	economic	gain.	Being	left	out	of	the	status	means	that	not	only	does	a	
worker	not	gain	wealth,	but	they	are	also	viewed	as	disposable	commodities,	regardless	of	their	
cultural	and	economic	contributions.	
	
	
	
	 	
	 133	
Limitations	and	Future	Work	
	 My	use	of	the	GCC	leads	to	one	notable	limitation	of	this	work,	it’s	limited	applicability	
outside	of	the	region.	As	I	note	in	Chapter	6,	the	conditions	surrounding	the	GCC’s	rejection	of	
liberal	citizenship	norms	cannot	be	effectively	extended	to	other	situations.	The	histories,	
economic	arrangements,	and	cultural	influences	are	specific	to	the	member	countries.	While	
similarities	may	be	observed	in	other	authoritarian	regimes	or	monoethnic	states,	the	path	to	
script	rejection	is	based	in	local	experience.	
	 Despite	the	drawbacks	of	cultural	peculiarities,	this	study	provides	tools	that	can	be	
used	in	future	global	policy	assessments.	First,	the	holistic	approach	used	to	analyze	script	
adoption	is	useful	in	identifying	the	local	intricacies	at	play.	The	political,	economic,	social,	and	
cultural	influences	in	government	policy	cannot	be	explained	away.	While	bureaucracy	allows	
for	agents	to	make	policy	decisions	according	to	their	own	beliefs,	those	beliefs	are	founded	in	
personal	experience.	Each	agent	is	the	product	of	past	and	present	experiences.	Further,	the	
station	they	occupy	within	the	bureaucratic	system	limits	their	power.	While	a	Minister	of	
Immigration	in	one	country	may	be	able	to	effectively	stop	movement	into	the	country,	an	
individual	with	the	same	title	in	another	region	may	not	be	allowed	to	take	that	action.	Thus,	
these	holistic	factors	can	affect	national	offices	and	their	practices.	
	 A	second	novel	contribution	of	this	research	concerns	CIPs.	While	the	exact	number	of	
individuals	taking	advantage	of	CIPs	is	unknown,	this	work	is	among	the	first	to	create	a	
complete	list	of	the	type	of	programs	available.	By	identifying	the	enacted	programs,	
researchers	can,	then,	shift	their	focus	to	who	is	using	what	program,	and	begin	to	address	
many	of	the	assumptions	around	golden	passports.	Do	CIP	users	represent	a	new	power	elite?	
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How	often	are	these	programs	used	to	expel	unwanted	groups?	What	are	the	experiences	by	
these	groups	once	they	are	deported?	These	questions	provide	opportunities	for	both	
quantitative	and	qualitative	avenues	of	inquiry,	where	one	can	learn	the	breadth	of	CIP	
influence	through	demographic	tracking	and	see	the	lived	experience	via	personal	interviews.	
	 Such	research	opportunities	also	highlight	some	specific	areas	of	inquiry	that	I	would	
like	to	see	take	shape.	The	first	concern	is	tied	to	the	aforementioned	logistics	of	movement.	
While	there	are	various	sources	of	data	to	assess	traditional	immigration	and	refugee	
movements,	there	is	not	a	similar	source	for	privileged	movement	methods,	aside	from	
“formal”	systems	like	the	United	States’	EB-5	Visa.	I	suspect	that	this	is	due,	in	part,	to	the	
profiles	of	those	obtaining	CIPs.	Most	CIPs	are	only	open	to	the	highest	economic	strata	of	
society,	as	such,	these	individuals	can	also	afford	privacy.	As	noted	earlier	in	this	work,	when	
performing	internet	searches	for	details	on	CIPs,	I	encountered	numerous	websites	for	brokers	
offering	their	services.	All	a	client	must	do	to	gain	a	new	passport	is	to	pay	the	firm	and	they	
will	take	care	of	the	actual	process.	This	affords	applicants	a	level	of	anonymity	since	they	may	
not	be	required	to	sign	forms	as	these	firms	can	act	as	legal	representatives.	Essentially,	one	
could	gain	a	new	citizenship	without	divulging	the	process	to	any	outside	group.	Further,	some	
countries	highlight	the	economic	benefits	of	their	CIPs.	By	purchasing	citizenship	in	some	
countries,	one	can	then,	use	them	as	a	tax	haven	and	avoid	paying	the	local	rates	(Gittleson	
2014).	To	ensure	this	benefit	is	viable,	those	countries	must	protect	the	identities	of	their	
passport	holders,	providing	a	specific	level	of	anonymity.	
	 The	second	area	of	inquiry	that	could	benefit	in	the	coming	years	is	in	the	realm	of	
public	opinion.	Telhami’s	(2013)	survey	of	public	perceptions	toward	democracy	in	the	Middle	
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East	is	among	the	only	modern	substantive	works	to	consider	how	the	people	feel.	While	there	
is	a	litany	of	works	available	to	assess	Western	perceptions	of	Middle	Eastern	immigrants,	I	was	
unable	to	locate	a	single	study	asking	similar	questions	to	Middle	Eastern	populations.	This	
could	be	due	to	the	difficulties	associated	with	gaining	approvals	for	surveys	in	many	of	the	
countries	(Telhami	2013),	but	it	would	be	useful	to	ask,	“How	do	you	feel	about	immigrants?”	
Limited	anecdotal	evidence	suggests	that	many	individuals	are	indifferent	toward	non-nationals	
in	the	region	(Abdi	2015;	Abrahamian	2015;	Kanna	2011),	but	there	is	no	broader	data	
available.	I	suspect	that	in	the	GCC’s	case,	that	many	respondents	may	view	non-nationals	with	
indifference,	but	without	public	opinion	data	to	show	this,	I	cannot	be	certain	and	nor	can	other	
researchers.	
	
Closing	Thoughts	
	 While	inequality	is	a	constant	in	our	everyday	lives,	how	humanity	navigates	those	lives	
varies	greatly	according	to	our	basic	status	our	citizenship.	As	Milanovic	(2013)	points	out	that	if	
one	knew	nothing	else	about	any	given	individual	in	the	world,	they	could,	with	a	reasonable	
amount	of	confidence,	predict	their	income	just	from	the	knowledge	of	their	citizenship.	
Certainly,	inequality	is	a	relative	term,	as	one	nation’s	middle-class	may	be	comparable	to	
another’s	wealthy	elite,	but	I	argue	that	the	different	opportunities	afforded	by	our	citizenships	
can	be	equally	impactful.	Membership	in	a	wealthy,	“developed”	country	could	mean	that	
citizens	will	be	able	to	get	an	advanced	education,	remain	safe	during	their	daily	lives,	and	voice	
dissent	openly.	Others	with	citizenships	in	authoritarian	or	“undeveloped”	areas	may	see	their	
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life	expectancies	shortened,	any	public	disagreements	quashed,	and	limited	opportunities	for	
movement.	
	 To	limit	the	impact	of	global	inequality,	one	must	continue	to	debate	the	citizenship	
question.	Are	systems	based	on	universal	human	rights	the	right	decision?	If	so,	who	will	ensure	
those	rights	are	equally	distributed?	Who	is	considered	a	citizen	here?	Who	can	be	protected?	
Who	can	be?	Our	problems	are	increasingly	global	with	refugee	populations	flowing	in-and-out	
of	foreign	lands.	How	do	statuses	affect	them?	What	of	the	East	Asian	domestic	workers	and	
construction	crews	in	Dubai?	Citizenship	is,	not	only,	tied	to	us,	but	it	becomes	our	reflection.	
People	with	“good”	passports	don’t	think	about	them	much.	But	people	with	“bad”	passports	
think	of	them	a	great	deal.	To	the	wealthy,	this	is	particularly	insulting:	A	bad	passport	is	like	a	
phantom	limb	that	won’t	stop	tingling	no	matter	how	much	money,	power,	or	success	they’ve	
accumulated—a	constant	reminder	that	the	playing	field	is	never	truly	level,	and	that	life	for	
your	average	Canadian	billionaire	will	be	easier	than	for	a	billionaire	from	Botswana	or	Peru.	
(Abrahamian	2015:73)	
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Appendix	A:	Ascriptive	Citizenship	Norms	
	
	
The	following	list	outlines	the	use	of	ascriptive	citizenship	norms	by	modern	nation-
states.	While	all	countries	use	some	form	of	the	jus	sanguinis—blood—form	to	pass	on	
citizenship	between	generations,	variations	of	the	jus	soli—soil—method	are	less	frequent.	The	
countries	that	rely—at	least,	in	part—on	the	location	of	one’s	birth	as	an	indicator	of	group	
membership	are	outlined	below,	and	delineated	according	to	the	type	of	political	regime	in	
power	in	the	given	country.	
	
Authoritarian:	Azerbaijan,	Cuba,	Gambia,	Guinea-Bissau,	Rwanda	
	
	
Non-Authoritarian:	Albania,	Antigua	&	Barbuda,	Argentina,	Austria,	Barbados,	Belize,	Bolivia,	
Brazil,	Canada,	Chile,	Costa	Rica,	Curaçao,	Dominica,	Dominican	Republic,	Ecuador,	El	Salvador,	
Grenada,	Guatemala,	Guyana,	Honduras,	Ireland,	Jamaica,	Lesotho,	Mauritania,	Mauritius,	
Mexico,	Nepal,	Nicaragua,	Pakistan,	Panama,	Paraguay,	Peru,	Saint	Kitts	&	Nevis,	Saint	Lucia,	
Saint	Vincent	&	The	Grenadines,	South	Africa,	Spain,	Trinidad	&	Tobago,	United	States,	
Uruguay,	Venezuela,	Zambia	
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Appendix	B:	Codebook	
	
The	following	list	of	codes	used	in	this	research	was	based	on	Marshall’s	(2006)	framework	of	
citizenship	rights.	All	codes	existed	in	a	binary	of	whether	the	language	for	each	code	was	
present	or	absent	in	the	source	material.	When	present	the	intricacies	of	the	language	was	also	
observed.	
	
Rights	codes:	
• Presence	or	absence	of	legal	rights	for	dual	citizens	
• Economic	rights:	
o Right	to	own	private	property	for	a	business	
§ Rural	business	
§ Urban	business	
o Right	to	make	investments	in	stock	market	
o Employment:	is	additional	documentation	needed	for	the	dual	citizen?	
§ Visa	
§ Work	Permit	
§ None	
o Right	to	own	private	property	(home)	
§ Rural	
§ Urban	
o Taxes:	which	country	is	responsible	for	withholding	tax?	
§ Primary	(sending)	country	
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§ Secondary	(receiving)	country	
§ Both	
• Political	rights	
o Running	for	political	office	
o Allowed	to	run	for	local	office	
§ Primary	country	
§ Secondary	country	
o Allowed	to	Run	for	National	Office	
§ Primary	country	
§ Secondary	country	
o Allowed	to	make	political	contributions	
o Barred	from	running	for	office	
§ Federal	
§ Local	
o Voting	Rights	
§ Primary	country	
§ Secondary	country	
§ None	
• Social	Rights	
o Movement	within	or	between	countries	
§ Free	
§ Limited	
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o Medical	Care	
o Government	Assistance:	who	provides	assistance?	
§ Primary	
§ Secondary	
§ Both	
o Religion:	is	adoption	of	a	national	religion	required	for	citizenship?	
§ Required	
§ Not	required	
	
Strong	Citizenship	codes:	
• jus	sanguinis	
• jus	soli	
• Other	method	
	
Weak	Citizenship	codes:	
• Naturalization	process	
o Military	service	required	
o Ethnic	group	membership	
o Exemption	from	process	(either	individuals	or	groups)	
o Familial	ties	
o Has	employment	
o Has	not	committed	crimes	
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o Land	occupation	(e.g.	living	in	an	area	when	it	is	incorporated)	
o Child’s	choice	(child	has	a	choice	whether	to	apply)	
o Minimum	age	for	to	start	process	
o Oath	or	Proclamation	of	allegiance	required	to	complete	process	
o Period	of	residency	
o Personal	health	(free	of	disease)	
o Religious	affiliation	
o Renounce	original	citizenship	
o Speaks	dominant	language	
• Dual	Citizenship	(presence	or	absence)	
• Merit-based	citizenship	
• Multiple	citizenships	
• Spousal	citizenship	
	
Regime	codes:	
• Liberal	democracy	
• Constitutional	monarchy	
• Emirati	
• Communist	
	
Revocation	of	Citizenship	(how	is	citizenship	lost?):	
• Denial	of	citizenship	(who	is	excluded)	
	157	
Curriculum	Vitae 
David	J.	Wolover	
	
	
Education	
	
Ph.D.,	University	of	Wisconsin-Milwaukee,	Milwaukee,	WI—Sociology	(2011-2017)	
Dissertation	title:	Clashing	Ideals	of	Citizenship:	Norms	of	Inclusion	and	the	Middle	East	
	 	
Graduate	Committee:	Prof.	A.	Aneesh,	Prof.	Gordon	Gauchat,	Prof.	Ivan	Ascher,	
	 Dr.	Oriol	Mirosa	
	
M.A.,	University	of	Wisconsin-Milwaukee,	Milwaukee,	WI—Sociology,	2011	
	
B.S.,	Grand	Valley	State	University,	Allendale,	MI—Anthropology,	2003		
(North	Central	College)	
	
Research	Interests	
	
Global	&	Transnational	Sociology,	Globalization	and	Citizenship,	International	Migration,	
Immigration	Policy,	Inequality,	Technology	and	Society,	Sociology	of	Media,	Qualitative	
Methods,	Theory	
	
Publications	
	
Peer	Reviewed	
	
Wolover,	D.J.	2016.	“An	Issue	of	Attribution:	The	Tunisian	Revolution,	Media	Interaction,	and		
Agency.”	New	Media	&	Society.	18(2):185-200.	
	
Aneesh,	A.	and	D.J.	Wolover.	2017.	“Citizenship	and	Inequality	in	a	Global	Age.”	Sociology		
Compass.	DOI	10.1111/soc4.12477	
	
In	Progress	
	
Aneesh,	A.	and	D.J.	Wolover.	“The	Strength	of	Weak	Citizenship.”	
	
Research	
	
2017,	Finding	Their	Place:	A	Comparative	Study	of	Refugee	Resettlement	in	Local	Communities		
and	Economies,	University	of	Wisconsin—Oshkosh,	Co-Coordinator	of	Milwaukee-Metro	
Research	Site	
	158	
Teaching		
	
Lectureships	
2018,	University	of	Wisconsin—Milwaukee,	Social	Change	(Soc.	325)	and	The	Social		
Organization	of	Technology	(Soc.	327)	
											
											University	of	Wisconsin—Oshkosh,	Modern	Social	Problems	(Soc.	151)	and	Social		
Control	(Soc.	355)	
	
2017,	UWM,	Social	Change	in	the	Global	Economy	(Soc.	235)	and	The	Social	Organization	of		
Technology	(Soc.	327,	online	section)	
	
2017	(summer	interim),	UWM,	Introduction	to	Sociology	(Soc.	101)	
	
2016,	UWM,	Introduction	to	Sociology	(Soc.	101)	and	The	Social	Organization	of	Technology		
(Soc.	327,	online	section)	
	
2016,	Gateway	Technical	College,	Introduction	to	Sociology	
	
2016,	UWM,	The	Social	Organization	of	Technology	(Soc.	327,	online	section)	
	
2016,	UWO,	Introduction	to	Sociology	(Soc.	101)	
	
2015-2016,	UWM,	Introduction	to	Sociology	(Soc.	101)	and	The	Social	Organization	of		
Technology	(Soc.	327)	
	
2014-2015,	UWM,	Introduction	to	Sociology	(Soc.	101)	
	
2012-2014,	UWM,	The	Social	Organization	of	Technology	(Soc.	327)	
	
2014,	Bryant	&	Stratton	College,	Principles	of	Psychology	(Psyc.	101)	
	
2013,	Bryant	&	Stratton	College,	Principles	of	Sociology	(Socs.	102)	and	Principles	of		
Psychology	(Psyc.	101)	
	
2013,	UWO,	Special	Topics	in	Sociology:	The	Social	Organization	of	Technology	(Soc.	407)	
	
2012,	UWO,	Introduction	to	Sociology	(Soc.	101)	
	
Teaching	Assistantships	
2010-2012,	Soc.	101—Introduction	to	Sociology	(Soc.	101),	Dr.	Kent	Redding—	
Supervising	Professor	
	
2009-2010,	Criminology	(Soc.	241),	Dr.	Donald	Green—Supervising	Professor	
	159	
Awards	and	Scholarships	
	
2016,	Graduate	Student	Paper	Award,	Sociology,	University	of	Wisconsin—Milwaukee	
	
2011-2012,	Chancellor’s	Graduate	Student	Award,	University	of	Wisconsin—Milwaukee		
	
1998-2000,	Presidential	Scholarship	(North	Central	College)		
	
Presentations	
	
2016,	Midwest	Sociological	Society	Annual	Meeting:	Not	Just	a	Matter	of	Politics:	Non-	
Adoption	of	Liberal	Citizenship	Norms	Among	Authoritarian	Regimes	
	
2016,	MSS	Annual	Meeting,	Session	Presider:	Situated	Knowledges	in	Global	Sociology	
	
2014,	American	Sociological	Association	Annual	Meeting,	Regular	Session:	The	Transnational		
Soul:	Citizenship(s)	in	a	Global	Age	
	
2012,	Eastern	Sociological	Society	Annual	Meeting,	MSS	Annual	Meeting,	UWM	Sociology		
Department	Colloquium:	A	New	Media	Fueled	Revolution?:	U.S.	Embassy	Cables,		
WikiLeaks,	and	the	Tunisian	Revolution	
	
2010,	Wisconsin	Sociological	Association/Wisconsin	Political	Science	Association	Conference,		
Panel	Discussion:	Applying	to,	Getting	In	and	Surviving	Graduate	School	
	
Guest	Lecture	
	
2013,	“An	Issue	of	Attribution:	The	Tunisian	Revolution,	Media	Interaction,	and	Agency,”		
Globalization	and	Technology	(Global	202),	November	2013.	
	
Professional	Memberships	and	Service	
	
American	Sociological	Association,	Midwest	Sociological	Society,	Society	for	the	Study	of		
Social	Problems,	Alpha	Kappa	Delta	(Sociological	Honor	Society),	Lambda	Alpha—Honors	
Graduate	(Anthropological	Honor	Society),	Beta	Beta	Beta	(Biological	Honor	Society)	
	
2015,	2016,	UWM	Graduate	School	Wisconsin	State	Fair	Volunteer	
	
2013,	Member,	UWM	Sociology	Department	Colloquium	Committee	
	
Manuscript	Reviews:	Journal	of	Communication,	New	Media	&	Society	
	
	
	
	160	
M.A.	Thesis	Title	
	
A	New	Media	Fueled	Revolution?:	U.S.	Embassy	Cables,	WikiLeaks,	and	the	Tunisian		
	 Revolution,	Dr.	A.	Aneesh—Committee	Chair	
	
Completed	Graduate	Coursework	
	
Course	work:	Systematic	Sociological	Theory;	Research	Methods	in	Sociology;	Advanced		
Statistical	Methods;	Methods	of	Research	and	Analysis	for	Urban	Social	Institutions	II;	
Discourse	Analysis;	Introduction	to	SAS	Programming;	Survey	Methods	
	
Seminars:	Sociology	of	Culture;	Political	Sociology;	Urban	Social	Structure;	Family	and		
Intimate	Relationships;	Sociology	of	Organizations;	Sociology	of	Religion;	Social	
Inequality;	Intercultural	Communications;	The	Digital	Mirror;	Sociology	of	Contemporary	
Institutions;	Race	and	Ethnic	Relations;	Globalization,	Inequality,	and	Citizen	Welfare	
	
Relevant	Skills	
	
SPSS,	SAS,	and	STATA	statistical	programs	
Dedoose	qualitative	analysis	software	
Managing	courses	on	the	Desire	to	Learn	(D2L)	and	Blackboard	course	systems	
Designing	and	implementing	online	courses	
Experience	teaching	large-enrollment	lecture	courses	and	small-enrollment	seminar	courses		
	
